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NCAA v. TARKANIAIm. A DELEGATION OF UNFETTERED
DIsCRETION
THE CONTROVERSY in NCAA v. Tarkanian arose out of va-
rious sanctions imposed by the National Collegiate Athletic As-
sociation (NCAA) upon the University of Nevada, Las Vegas
(UNLV) and its head basketball coach, Jerry Tarkanian. Jerry
Tarkanian became head basketball coach at UNLV in 1973. Prior
to his assumption of that position, UNLV's basketball team had a
14-14 record and was virtually unknown on the national level.'
Four years later, Tarkanian improved the team's record to 29-3
and the team finished third in the NCAA championship tourna-
ment.2 In 1977, UNLV rewarded Tarkanian with tenure.3
Tarkanian's employer, UNLV, is a branch of the University
of Nevada, which is organized and operated pursuant to the Con-
stitution, statutes, and regulations of the state of Nevada. UNLV
depends upon the state of Nevada for its financial support.4 It is
also one of approximately 960 institutions comprising the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association. Like UNLV, most of the
NCAA's members are colleges which conduct major athletic pro-
grams.5 The fundamental policy of the NCAA is to maintain the
scholastic aspects of intercollegiate competition among the ath-
letes of its members.' The NCAA promulgates rules which specif-
ically prescribe the conduct of its member athletes in order to en-
force this ideal. Among other issues, the regulations established by
the NCAA specifically address academic standards, admission re-
quirements, financial aid, and athletic recruiting.
The NCAA established a Committee on Infractions to en-
force its rules, which is commissioned with the authority to inves-
I. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 456 (1988).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 457. As head coach, Tarkanian received $125,000 per year, plus 10% of the
proceeds received by UNLV for participating in the NCAA championship tournament. He
also received a substantial sum from other activities, such as product endorsements, partici-
pation in basketball camps, and television and radio appearances. Id. at 456 n.l.
4. Id. at 457.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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tigate members, make factual determinations, and impose sanc-
tions.8 Although the committee may not directly sanction an
employee of a member institution, it may order that institution to
show cause why the institution should not suffer further penalties
for failing to punish the violating employee. Members of the
NCAA are also required to fully cooperate with the committee
and to assist in any investigation.9
In the early 1970s, NCAA officials began to suspect UNLV
of violating various NCAA recruitment rules.'" Approximately
three years later, the NCAA's Committee on Infractions notified
the University that it was going to commence an "official inquiry"
and requested UNLV to conduct a thorough investigation. Eight
months later, the University responded with a detailed report, de-
nying all allegations and declaring head coach Tarkanian com-
pletely innocent of any wrongdoing." The NCAA responded by
conducting a four-day formal hearing at which it concluded that
UNLV had committed thirty-eight violations of NCAA rules, ten
of which were attributed solely to Tarkanian. 2
The committee also imposed a somewhat severe series of
sanctions. These sanctions, which were approved by the NCAA's
Council, placed UNLV on a two-year period of probation, during
which its "basketball team could not participate in post-season
games or appear on television."' 3 The committee also forced
"UNLV to show cause why additional penalties should not be im-
posed against UNLV if it failed to discipline Tarkanian by remov-
ing him completely from the university's intercollegiate athletic
program during the probation period."' 4
The NCAA ruling put UNLV in a most precarious position
- UNLV could decide to: (1) refuse to adhere to the NCAA's
mandate and risk further punishment by the NCAA, (2) adhere
to its ruling by temporarily banishing Tarkanian, or (3) sever all
ties with the NCAA.'5 Although UNLV maintained that
Tarkanian was innocent of any wrongdoing, its president opted to
adhere to the NCAA's rulings by temporarily precluding
8. Id.
9. Id. at 458.
10. Id. at 458. The committee initiated a preliminary inquiry in 1972. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 459.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Tarkanian from involvement in UNLV's intercollegiate athletic
programs.16
Not surprisingly, this decision upset Tarkanian, who was be-
ing forced to surrender his prestigious position as well as a sub-
stantial portion of his income.1 Tarkanian, therefore, filed a sec-
tion 1983 action, in Nevada state court,' seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against his employer.19 He alleged that the uni-
versity had "deprived him of property and liberty without the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. '2' The trial court ruled in favor of
Tarkanian.21 On appeal, the NCAA argued in an amicus curiae
brief that the suit should be dismissed because a controversy did
not exist. In addition, the NCAA argued that even if a contro-
versy did exist, it should be involved in the suit as a necessary
party. Concluding that a controversy did exist and that the
NCAA was a necessary party, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled
that the lower court's decision should be reversed and remanded
to permit joinder of the NCAA.2 Accordingly, Tarkanian
amended his complaint by adding the NCAA. After four years of
delay, the trial court again held in favor of Tarkanian, enjoining
UNLV from disciplining Tarkanian and enjoining the NCAA
from enforcing its sanctions against UNLV. 3
Predictably, the NCAA appealed this decision to the Nevada
Supreme Court where the lower court decision was upheld.24 The
Nevada Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA had engaged in
state action, which is a necessary finding for a section 1983 claim.
In arriving at this preliminary conclusion, the court held that the
right or duty to discipline public employees is vested solely within
the state and that the state may not dodge the liability attached to
such power by simply delegating that duty to a private entity.25
The court also felt that since the NCAA was composed primarily
16. Id.
17. As a tenured professor, Tarkanian would have earned $53,000 per year; as a
head basketball coach and tenured professor, he would have made at least $125,000 per
year, and enjoyed the benefits flowing from his success and notoriety. Id. at 456 n.1.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986).
19. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. University of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. 389, 594 P.2d 1159 (1979).
23. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 460.
24. Tarkanian v. NCAA, 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987).
25. Id. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1348.
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of government-funded institutions, the NCAA must be regarded
as a state actor for section 1983 purposes. 6 Based upon that con-
clusion, the Nevada Supreme Court turned to the merits of the
controversy and affirmed the lower court's decision.
Unwilling to surrender, the NCAA appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. This case presented the Court with an op-
portunity to lay to rest a brewing controversy as to the proper
characterization of the NCAA for purposes of section 1983
actions.
I. HISTORY
Prior to 1982, most courts confronted with this issue held
that the NCAA was a state actor,. and therefore, susceptible to
suit under section 1983.28 Among the earlier cases, the best char-
acterization of the NCAA was presented in Howard University v.
NCAA.29 In that case, the NCAA sought to place Howard's soc-
cer team on a one-year probation and make it ineligible for post-
season competition as a penalty for allegedly violating various
NCAA rules pertaining to player eligibility. Following Supreme
Court precedent, the Howard court determined that the critical
inquiry was whether the NCAA's conduct, although initially pri-
vate in character, became "so entwined with governmental policies
or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become
subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state ac-
tion."30 The court further stated that "the government's involve-
ment need not be either exclusive or direct; governmental action
may be found even though the government's participation 'was pe-
ripheral, or its action was only one of several co-operative forces
leading to the constitutional violation.' "31 Thus, an individual
need not carry a badge of state authority to be considered a state
actor.3 2
Before turning to the merits of the case, the court noted that
26. Id. at 335, 741 P.2d at 1347.
27. Id. at 333, 741 P.2d at 1346.
28. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 457 n.5.
29. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
30. Id. at 217 (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
31. Id. (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966)).
32. This conclusion is contrary to an earlier understanding set forth in Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), where the Court stated that liability attaches only to those
"who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they
act in accordance with their authority or misuse it." Id. at 172.
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approximately half of the NCAA's participants were publicly-
funded institutions and that "public institutions provide[d] the
vast majority of the NCAA's capital."3 " In addition, representa-
tives from public schools accounted for most of the members of
the NCAA's governing council. The court also stated that, in re-
turn, the NCAA provided an immeasurably valuable service to
public institutions through their supervision of intercollegiate ath-
letics.34 Based upon the interdependence between state institutions
and the NCAA, the court held that state action was present, and
therefore, federal jurisdiction existed. The court explained that to
hold otherwise would allow states to avoid constitutional restric-
tions by merely "banding together to form or to support a 'private'
organization to which they have relinquished some portion of their
governmental power." 35
Although Howard was reaffirmed in several cases involving
student-athletes, 36 the Supreme Court brought this trend to an ab-
rupt halt in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,"7 which involved neither
the NCAA nor student athletics. In Lugar, Edmondson Oil Co.
filed suit to collect on a debt from Lugar, a lessee-operator of a
truck stop in Virginia. After filing suit, Edmondson sought and
received a prejudgment attachment of some of the petitioner's'
property, pursuant to Virginia law.8 The attachment was later
dismissed by the trial judge, but the petitioner filed suit in federal
court against Edmondson pursuant to section 1983 alleging that
Edmondson and the state had acted jointly to deprive him of his
property without due process of law.39
In order to determine whether a private party may be con-
verted into a state actor for the purpose of obtaining subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, the Court set forth a two-pronged test:
33. Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
34. Id. at 220.
35. Id. at 220 (quoting Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1975)).
36. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977)(the university was permitted to avail itself of the federal
courts to contest an NCAA ruling placing the university's athletic teams on indefinite pro-
bation for refusing to find three students ineligible to compete in intercollegiate athletics);
Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975)(five collegiate basketball players were
permitted to seek injunctive relief to prevent the NCAA from enforcing a ruling which
prohibited them from competing in various NCAA tournaments).
37. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
38. The "attachment procedure required only that Edmondson allege in an ex parte
petition, a belief that petitioner was disposing of or might dispose of his property in order
to defeat his creditors." Id. at 924.
39. Id. at 925.
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[T]he first question is whether the claimed deprivation has re-
sulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source
in state authority. The second question is whether, under the
facts of this case, respondents, who are private parties, may be
appropriately characterized as "state actors."
"Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the pro-
hibited action, are acting 'under color' of law for purposes of the
statute. To act 'under color' of law does not require that the
accused be an officer of the state. It is enough that he is a willful
participant in joint activity with the state or its agents."40
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the petitioner
was deprived of his property through state action and that the de-
fendants were, therefore, acting under color of state law when
they participated in the petitioner's deprivation.4
Since the decision in Lugar, nearly all lower court decisions
confronting fourteenth amendment and section 1983 claims
against the NCAA have held that the NCAA is not a state ac-
tor.42 For instance, in Graham v. NCAA,43 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that in order to establish that the NCAA is
a state actor, it must be proven either that: "(1) the NCAA was
serving a function which was traditionally and exclusively the
state's prerogative, or (2) the state or its agencies caused, con-
trolled or directed the NCAA's action."" Basing its decision on
this conservative standard, the court held that the plaintiff was
unable to establish that the NCAA was a state actor under either
prong of the test, and that the plaintiff's complaint was properly
dismissed.4 5
In the Tarkanian controversy, however, the Nevada Supreme
Court applied the rule enunciated in Lugar to reach the opposite
conclusion. Applying the Lugar two-pronged test, the court stated:
The first prong [of Lugar] is met because no third party
40. Id. at 939, 941 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
41. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942.
42. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 457 n.5.
43. 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986)(two Graham College football players brought suit
alleging that the implementation of various university and NCAA rules had prevented
them from playing football, in violation of their constitutional rights).
44. Id. at 958.
45. Id. The Graham test was also applied by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987), where the court held that a student who
claimed he was denied his constitutional rights by an NCAA ruling declaring him ineligi-
ble to play intercollegiate hockey failed to state a claim against the NCAA.
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could impose disciplinary sanctions upon a state university em-
ployee unless the third party received the right or privilege from
the university. Thus, the deprivation which Tarkanian alleges is
caused by the exercise of a right or privilege created by the
state. Also, in the instant case, both UNLV and the NCAA
must be considered state actors. By delegating authority to the
NCAA over athletic personnel decisions and by imposing the
NCAA sanctions against Tarkanian, UNLV acted jointly with
the NCAA."6
Although the plausibility of the Nevada Supreme Court's ap-
proach may seem appealing, the United States Supreme Court
was not persuaded.
II. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian
A. Opinion of the Court
In NCAA v. Tarkanian, the Supreme Court was finally given
an opportunity to determine the NCAA's status for purposes of
section 1983 actions. At first glance, this issue appears simple and
well-defined. The Court, however, devoted a substantial portion of
its opinion to refining the issue. Eventually, the Court concluded
that "the question is not whether UNLV participated to a critical
extent in the NCAA's activities, but whether UNLV's actions in
compliance with the NCAA rules and recommendations turned
the NCAA's conduct into state action. 47
The Court began by reiterating a well-known basic principle
- the fourteenth amendment's due process clause does not apply
to private conduct, "no matter how unfair that conduct may be."
48
Similarly, the Court reminded its readers that section 1983 was
intended to provide a remedy for only those constitutional viola-
tions which occur "under color of" state law.49
Turning to the parties, the Court acknowledged that this was
not a typical section 1983 state action case. Tarkanian's primary
injury, his suspension, was directly imposed by the UNLV, an un-
disputed state actor. Thus, through their suspension of a tenured
employee, UNLV was clearly bound by the constraints of the
fourteenth amendment and susceptible to suit under section
46. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 103 Nev. 331, 337, 741 P.2d 1345, 1349 (1987).
47. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 462.
48. Id. at 461.
49. Id. at 462.
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1983.50
With respect to the NCAA, the Court began by considering
whether the NCAA acted under color of state law when it
promulgated the rules in question. Unlike the court in Howard,
the Supreme Court focused solely upon the participation of the
NCAA representatives from the State of Nevada rather than on
the collective participation of all public institutions within the
NCAA. From this perspective, the Court concluded that the
NCAA's legislation came not from Nevada but from an "organi-
zation that is independent of any particular State.""1 Further-
more, the Court assumed that UNLV was free to disassociate it-
self from the NCAA and create its own rules. Based upon that
assumption, the Court ruled that the NCAA was not acting under
color of state law when it promulgated its rules even though Ne-
vada had participated in their enactment and implemented their
standards.52
Next, the Court considered whether the NCAA acted under
color of state law when it investigated UNLV and issued its deter-
minations concerning Tarkanian. Tarkanian argued that such au-
thority resulted from a delegation of power from UNLV to the
NCAA, and therefore, must be classified as state action.53 The
Court recognized that "a state may delegate authority to a private
party and thereby make that party a state actor."" The Court,
however, insisted that the NCAA was without any authority to
sanction any UNLV employee, including Tarkanian. Although the
Association could impose severe sanctions upon the university for
failing to implement its recommendations, the NCAA could not
utilize any governmental form of enforcement to carry them out.55
Furthermore, since the NCAA and UNLV acted more like adver-
saries than partners throughout this' process, the Court felt that
any arguments alleging joint action were clearly without merit.56
As a last resort, Tarkanian argued that "the power of the
NCAA is so great that UNLV has no practical alternative to
compliance with its demands. 57 In response to that argument, the
50. Id.
51. Id. (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 463.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 464.
55. Id. at 464-65.
56. Id. at 464.
57. Id. at 465.
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Court held that "even if we assume that a private monopolist can
impose its will on a state agency by a threatened refusal to deal
with it, it does not follow that such a private party is therefore
acting under color of state law." '58 Having countered all of
Tarkanian's allegations, the Supreme Court concluded that the
NCAA was not a state actor and had not acted under color of
Nevada law. Thus, the decision rendered by the Nevada Supreme
Court was reversed.5
B. Dissenting Opinion
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the dissent relied upon a
more straightforward test. Citing precedent, the dissenters stated
that "private parties could be found to be state actors, if they
were 'jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged ac-
tion.' "0 The dissent applied this test by focusing on the relation-
ship between the NCAA and the UNLV. First, the dissent
pointed out that Tarkanian was suspended for violating NCAA
rules and that those rules had been contractually embraced by
UNLV. Second, under the terms of their membership agreement,
the NCAA was to conduct all hearings and serve as the fact
finder for all matters involving rule violations. Third, UNLV was
bound by any such factual determinations. Furthermore, those
findings were not subject to review by any other entity.61
The dissent also noted the irrelevancy of the fact that UNLV
had the option to sever its ties with the NCAA. The dissent ar-
gued that, as in a conspiracy, liability attaches when the parties
act in concert with respect to the wrongful act.62 Based upon this
approach, the dissent concluded that the NCAA was a state actor
and therefore subject to suit under section 1983.63
III. ANALYSIS
The distinction between the opinion of the majority and that
of the dissent lies not so much in the rules that they apply as it
does in the manner in which they apply them. The majority chose
a technical and conservative approach. The dissent, on the other
58. Id.
59. Id. at 466.
60. Id. at 466 (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1985)).
61. Id. at 466-67.
62. Id. at 467-68.
63. Id. at 468 (footnote omitted).
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hand, took a more pragmatic approach in an effort to achieve a
result that was both logical and just. Although both views have
obvious merits, the result of the case seems to indicate that the
dissent adopted the preferable alternative.
The critical factor in the majority's opinion was the fact that
the university, not the NCAA, was the entity that actually sus-
pended Tarkanian. The majority also relied heavily upon the fact
that UNLV was free to ignore the NCAA and to disassociate it-
self from the organizations. However, that conclusion arguably ig-
nores the importance of NCAA membership. NCAA membership
carries with it a tremendous amount of prestige. The resulting no-
toriety allows member institutions to benefit financially. Often,
NCAA games and tournaments are nationally televised. The pro-
ceeds from the television contracts "flow directly to the participat-
ing schools, primarily the public universities." '64 In the 1970s,
member institutions received approximately thirteen million dol-
lars annually through their affiliation with the NCAA.65 The pub-
licity provided to member institutions by the NCAA also adds a
tremendous boost to enrollment. Therefore, public universities
cannot simply disassociate themselves from the NCAA because
such a parting would be financially damaging to any institution.
With the constant threat of expulsion, universities are somewhat
forced to heed the recommendations imposed by the NCAA.
As the dissent points out, the NCAA's recommendations are
based upon factual determinations which may not be appealed to
another entity for review.66 Thus, the majority's decision grants
the NCAA unfettered discretion with respect to such *decisions.
With this authority, the Committee on Infractions can force a
university to suspend employees by threatening the univesity with
expulsion from the Association. Such authority is clearly suscepti-
ble to abuse. Jealous committee and council members, which are
representatives of other competing universities, could use their po-
sitions to initiate and impose sanctions. For the reasons stated
above, the view adopted by the dissent is preferable. By determin-
ing that the NCAA and the university were joint actors, its deci-
sion seems more in touch with the practical realities underlying
this controversy.
The potential ramifications of the majority's decision must
64. Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
65. Id.
66. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 467.
1432 [Vol. 39:1423
NCAA v. TARKANIAN
also be considered. As noted in Howard, the characterization of
the NCAA as a private actor for purposes of section 1983 creates
an avenue through which states can dodge section 1983 liability
by merely banding together to form a private organization "to
which they have relinquished some portion of their governmental
power."6 7 Under the majority's view, a private organization may
be entrusted with the authority to regulate a state agency, along
with its employees, provided that the organization does not en-
force its regulations with state enforcerhient mechanisms.68 Such
an organization would be free to make determinations and recom-
mendations concerning employee performance without fear of
penalty for any mistakes or intentional abuses of its authority.
This unfettered discretion would remain unchecked by section
1983 even if the private organization is a monopolist that could
indirectly inflict tremendous hardship on the state agency by sim-
ply refusing to deal with the agency if it failed to heed the organi-
zation's recommendations.69
Suppose a state were to surrender its authority to monitor the
performance of police officers to a private organization. Also, sup-
pose that membership in that organization greatly enhanced the
ability of states to receive federal funds. Such an organization
could indirectly force states to suspend officers, yet remain un-
daunted by section 1983. Thus, although the majority was unques-
tionably correct when it stated that section 1983 liability should
only be imposed upon state actors, one could easily envision a situ-
ation in which a private actor could force a state agency to carry
out its will.70 In such situations, state compliance with the rules
and recommendations of a private organization would turn the
private organization's conduct into state action which should be
subjected to the protections provided in section 1983. Therefore,
the rigid view of the majority should be limited to the facts of this
case and only be applied to cases involving the characterization of
the NCAA. Since the majority acknowledged that the Tarkanian
controversy was not a typical section 1983 state action case,7' lim-
67. Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(quoting Parish v.
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1975)). See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying
text.
68. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464-65.
69. Id. at 465.
70. Id. at 461.
71. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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iting the application of the Court's decision does not appear
unwarranted.
RICHARD A. Di Lisi
